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I. INTRODUCTION

Eighteen months after the 709 crackdown on human rights
lawyers, 1 a debate took place within China’s human rights lawyers’
communities. 2 It is a brief, yet passionate and provocative debate
focusing on some of the fundamental questions about law’s limits in
seeking justice and protecting rights in an authoritarian state and the
limited role of lawyers in their endeavour. Having grown for about
twenty years since the mid-1990s, human rights lawyers have engaged
in social-legal activism in wide policy areas including consumer
protection, anti-discrimination, rights in the criminal process, and the
* Faculty of law, The University of Hong Kong. This research was supported by a grant
from the RGC General Research Fund (HKU17613515).
1. For a critical analysis of the crackdown, see Fu Hualing, The July 9th (709) Crackdown
on Human Rights Lawyers: Legal Advocacy in an Authoritarian State, J. OF CONTEMPORARY
CHINA (forthcoming, 2018).
2. See, e.g., Chen Jiangang, Zhang Sizhi Lun [Thoughts on Zhang Sizhi] (Nov. 15, 2016),
http://www.mychinese.news/2016/11/blog-post_16.html [https://perma.cc/EV4C-88JY]; Yan
Wenxin, Zaitan Gean Tuidong Fazhi [Rethink About Promoting Rule of Law Through
Individual Cases, WALL OUTSIDE (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.letscorp.net/archives/113008
[https://perma.cc/SL84-3YQD].
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freedom of religion and speech. 3 The growth of legal rights and their
enhanced protection in China in the past two decades are inextricably
tied to China’s growing legal profession, especially a small group of
lawyers who variously called themselves weiquan lawyers, die-hard
lawyers, or human rights lawyers—lawyers who are public interestminded, legal rights-focused, and politically motivated in their battles
against arbitrary powers. 4
Yet, those are the lawyers who have received severe crackdown,
and the repression has naturally provoked some of them to reflect on
the vulnerability of the legal profession in the authoritarian state and
the future prospect of socio-legal activism in bringing meaningful
changes in society. 5 The debate involved two issues: one specific and
the other one general. The specific, pointed question that they have
raised is this: is the traditional case-focused and law-centred legal
mobilization, moderate or aggressive, still a feasible approach to take
to bring structural changes to the political system, incremental or
otherwise? 6 In the aftermath of the crackdown, estranged lawyers
started to reflect on their past success and failure, to cast doubts about
their potential of their own profession in catalysing political
transformation, and to express their deeply felt anxiety, frustration, and
confusion about law, courts, and human rights lawyering. 7
A more general question touches on a more sensitive issue relating
to the politics of lawyering. For the rights lawyers who have
experienced or witnessed the crackdown, the Party has revealed its true
nature and whatever hope that lawyers may have on law’s potential to
tame the Party must have proven false. 8 For them, what matters in the
Chinese political-legal system is Article 1 of the Constitution that states
3 . See generally Fu Hualing & Richard Cullen, Climbing the Weiquan Ladder: A
Radicalizing Process for Rights-Protection Lawyers, 205 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 40-59 (2011).
4. See JONATHAN BENNEY, DEFENDING RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (2012); Fu
Hualing & Richard Cullen (2008), Weinquan (Rights Protection) Lawyering in an Authoritarian
State: Building a Culture of Public Interesting Lawyering, 59 CHINA J. 111 (2008); EVA PILS,
CHINA’S HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS: ADVOCACY AND RESISTANCE (2014); Rachel E Stern,
Activist Lawyers in Post-Tiananmen China, 42 L. AND SOC. INQUIRY 234-51 (2017).
5. See, e.g., Sui Muqing, 709 zhishang: 709 Jingli [My Experience as a 709 Victim],
HRIC, https://www.hrichina.org/chs/zhong-guo-ren-quan-shuang-zhou-kan/sui-mu-qing-lushi-709zhi-shang-wo-de-709jing-li-tu [https://perma.cc/4G4A-C6LV].
6. For an analysis of the spectrum of human rights lawyering in China, see Fu and Cullen,
supra note 4. See also Sida Liu and Terence G. Halliday, CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN CHINA: THE
POLITICS OF LAWYERS AT WORK (2016).
7. Yan, supra note 2.
8. Id.
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clearly that China is a democratic dictatorship. 9 The occasional success
in a few legal battles, they admit, may have blinded their eyes on the
true nature of the Party state. 10 Some of them, they admit, may just have
forgotten that, in Svolik’s terms, repression is the “original sin” of
authoritarianism. 11 If that were the case, human rights lawyers should
step out of the shadow of law, call a spade a spade and confront the
Party head-on. Human rights lawyers need to be openly political.
Before the 2015 crackdown, China had experienced waves of
social-legal activism since the mid-1990s in which right discourses are
translated into rights practices. 12 As it happens, human rights lawyers
and other activists have been situated at the forefront in the tireless
efforts to expanding the sphere of rights and freedom and in
constraining the arbitrary exercise of state power. 13 Together with
media, especially social media and domestic Non-governmental
organizations (“NGOs”) working in different sectors, human rights
lawyers form a strategic “legal complex” in China in protecting legal
rights and freedom and in the process hold the Party state accountable
to its own legal rhetoric. 14 Supported and sometimes aided by foreign
donors, the legal complex used law as an entry point to engage in
social-legal activism in shaping public opinions and influencing court
decisions. For what they have done in leading and organizing those
movements, lawyers and other activists have paid heavy prices and, one
may argue, the prices that they pay are precisely indicative of their
significance and impact. During the crackdown, leading human rights
lawyers were placed under lengthy and secretive detention; many were
humiliated and forced to confess their sins in state controlled or
arranged media outlets, some were sentenced to lengthy imprisonment
terms for subverting state power, and all were placed under tight
control. 15 The post-crackdown era also witnessed enhanced
professional regulation by the government regulators—the Ministry of
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See MILAN W. SVOLIK, THE POLITICS OF AUTHORITARIAN RULE 10 (2012).
12. See generally BENNEY, supra note 4; Fu & Cullen, supra note 4; Pils, supra note 4;
Stern supra note 4.
13. See generally Fu, supra note 1.
14. See Fu Hualing, Can Lawyers Build a Legal Complex for the Rule of Law in China?,
HRIC (July 25, 2014), https://www.hrichina.org/en/china-rights-forum/can-lawyers-buildlegal-complex-rule-law-china [https://perma.cc/TN3L-VLFV].
15 . See CHINA HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS CONCERN GROUP, REPORT ON THE 709
CRACKDOWN (2016).
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Justice (“MoJ”) and its provincial and local counterparts. 16 With the
appointment of Fu Zhenghua as the Minister of Justice, the Party seems
to be determined to disappear human rights lawyering in China once
for all. 17
Ultimately all the challenging questions boil down to this: is there
a future for human rights lawyering in China as we know it? After
examining the debate on the future of rights lawyering among human
rights lawyers, this article proposes three overlapping alternatives for
human rights lawyers in the post-crackdown era: a triviality thesis, a
co-optation thesis, and a resilience thesis. While the authoritarian
system can be suffocating for its enemies, human rights lawyers can
struggle to create their own breathing space.
II. TRIVIALITY
The Triviality Thesis is a popular one and has gained currency in
recent years. 18 According to this thesis, the party-state has developed a
tight control, through fear and enhanced management, over the
profession, which is now structured in such a way that the political role
of lawyers is negligible. 19 It is not as if lawyers have not tried; human
rights lawyers have tried in many ways, in vain, to have an impact on
the system. 20 No matter how hard lawyers try, either in working within
the law or against the law, the system, as is expected, remains in firm

16. Chinese Authorities Continue to Suppress Lawyers after Replacing Minister of
Justice, CONG.-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA (Mar. 15, 2018), https://
www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/chinese-authorities-continue-to-suppresslawyers-after-replacing [https://perma.cc/3KCN-ZWFT].
17. As the Chief of the Beijing Police, Fu apparently orchestrated the 2011 jasmine
crackdown on human rights lawyers in Beijing. Fu was then promoted to the Ministry of Public
Security. As the Executive Vice Minister of Public security, he was behind the July 9 crackdown
on human rights lawyers in 2015. See Christian Shepherd, Chinese Rights Activists Fearful as
Policeman Takes Charge of Legal Affairs, REUTERS (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-china-parliament-rights/chinese-rights-activists-fearful-as-policeman-takes-chargeof-legal-affairs-idUSKBN1GX0C5 [https://perma.cc/L2RM-5PTZ].
18. See, e.g., Yan, supra note 2; Yedu, Fazhi Mengmie: Zhongguo Weiquan Yundong Binlin
Zhongjie [Broken Dream of the Rule of Law: China’s Weiquan Movement is Coming to an End],
12 DONGXIANG (2016), https://botanwang.com/articles/201612/法治梦灭，中国维权运动濒
临终结.html [https://perma.cc/Y76L-7ZJM].
19. See, e.g., Han Zhu, Eva Pils’s Human Rights in China, 19 ASIA-PACIFIC J. HUM. RTS
AND THE L. 74, 76 (2018) (book review).
20. See Eva Pils, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA: A SOCIAL PRACTICE IN THE SHADOWS OF
AUTHORITARIANISM 52-54 (2017).
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control, and can easily see off any challenge. 21 Lawyers’ contributions
and, for that matter, their challenges, if any, are trivial. 22 The triviality
thesis is based on four harmful impact that the crackdown had created
or reinforced.
First, there is the incapacitation impact. Repression refrains
lawyers from engaging in social-legal mobilization. 23 The high-profile
crackdown, coupled with lengthy terms of imprisonment and control
tightening further, has created a chilling effect to deter most of the
lawyers, their partners and supporters. 24 The crackdown has
incapacitated a rights movement that had taken two decades to build,
and, with the imprisonment, punishment or close monitoring of all key
movement leaders, the deterrent impact that the crackdown has sent has
an enduring effect on the legal profession generally. 25
Second, there is the isolation impact. The ground that produced
past leaders and activists no longer exist, and the support structure that
had gained strength is under stress and collapsing. 26 China under Xi
has become more repressive politically, and institutions that used to
nurture and support human rights lawyering have been weakened or
simply have vanished. 27 Clinical education and other platforms for law
students in public interest work are tightly controlled if still in existence
at all, depriving human rights lawyers of opportunities to recruit
volunteers and supporters and to use law schools as a platform to
promote public interest law. Clinical legal education networks that had
been instrumental in promoting experiential learning and social
practices among law students became inactive. 28 Foundations, which

21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Yan, supra note 2.
23. See China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, supra note 15; see also Alex W.
Palmer, ‘Flee at Once’: China’s Besieged Human Rights Lawyers, THE N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(July 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/magazine/the-lonely-crusade-of-chinashuman-rights-lawyers.html?_ga=2.5350324.644513532.15289673191693010699.1506870483.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Cyberspace, Religion, Lawyers, Dissidents: China’s Shrinking Civil Society under Xi
Jinping’s Crackdown, HKFP (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/10/18/
cyberspace-religion-lawyers-dissidents-chinas-shrinking-civil-society-xi-jinpings-crackdown/
[https://perma.cc/S2D4-ND9S].
27. Id.
28. Communications with lawyers and other related individuals (2017-18).
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provide much-needed financial support to law school clinics, have been
under political pressure to withdraw its support in that sector. 29
Law schools have been under pressure to sever ties with or put
greater control on, public interest law organizations. For examples, in
2010, Beijing University Law School ordered the Woman Legal
Studies and Service Center, led by Guo Jianmei, to leave the
University, 30 and in 2016, Wuhan University Law School ordered the
Public Interest and Development Law Institute, an advocacy NGO
closely affiliated with the law school, to leave the Law School
premises. 31 Under pressure, Wuhan University Law School also
changed the name of its well-known public interest law center, Center
for the Protection of Rights of Disadvantaged Citizens, which was set
up in 1992, into a Legal Aid Center, and also forced its director to
resign. 32 As similar chilling impact had been felt in other law schools
that have developed a legal aid and clinical education program. When
Guo Jianmei’s NGO was told to leave from Beijing University, there
was wide-spread criticism in the media of the University and the law
school for their action. 33 Similar actions that took place six years later
were met with deafening silence. 34
Equally significant, with the reform of civil procedural law, which
prohibits lay participation in litigation and the crackdown on rightsbased NGOs, law students are deprived of the opportunity to
experience social reality, which is regarded as the most important factor
29. Communications with lawyers and other related individuals (2017-18). For studies of
clinical legal education in China, see Cecily E. Baskir, Crossing Borders: Creating an American
Law Clinic In China, 19 CLINIC L. REV. 163 (2012); Benjamin L. Liebman Legal Aid and
Public Interest Law in China, 34 TEX. INT’L L. J. 211 (1999); Titi M. Liu, Transmission of
Public Interest Law: A Chinese Case Study, 13 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 263, 282-83
(2008).
30. See Wu Xiaolei, Beida Rongbuxia Guo Jianmei [Beida Forced Guo Jianmei to Leave],
SHIDAI ZHOUBAO [THE TIME WKLY.] (Apr. 15, 2010), http://business.sohu.com/20100415/n2
71520491.shtml [https://perma.cc/MF4R-2RNF].
31. Communication with Chinese lawyers (2017).
32. See China Society for Human Rights Studies, Wuhan University Center for Human
Rights Research and Education, CHINAHUMANRIGHTS.ORG (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.china
humanrights.org/html/2014/MAGAZINES_1010/805_3.html [https://perma.cc/EZ9C-AEN2].
33. For criticism in China’s official media, see, e.g., Wu, supra note 30; Zhang Han,
Legitimacy of a Legal Center, GLOBAL TIMES (May 12, 2010), http://www.globaltimes.cn/
special/2010-05/531143.html [https://perma.cc/A69G-W5T6]; Wang Xiaoyu, Guo Jianmei: Ni
Bushi Yige Ren Zai Qianxing [Guo Jianmei, You’re not Alone], DONGFAN ZAOBAO [ORIENTAL
MORNING POST] (Apr. 19, 2010), http://star.news.sohu.com/20100419/n271596866.shtml
[https://perma.cc/ZUZ9-GPL4].
34. Observation of media reports.
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in creating a public interest law identity. 35 Before 2013, Chinese law
allowed non-lawyer “citizen representatives,” commonly translated as
litigants ad litem, to appear in courts as counsel in administrative, civil
and criminal litigation. 36 In addition to qualified lawyers, any citizen
can be a legal representative in the litigation process. 37 Lay
participation in legal representation did not only compensate for the
shortage of lawyers, but also created opportunities for law school legal
aid centers and public interest-oriented NGOs to provide free legal aid
services to vulnerable groups in society. 38 In the end, it allowed
extraordinary opportunities for experiential learning and for nurturing
a public interest identity through the process. 39
Lay representation was significantly restricted after the 2013
reform of the Civil Procedural Law. 40 After the amendment, lay
representation is limited to circumstances in which the workplace or
the residential committee of a party to a litigation makes a
recommendation. 41 Because of the restriction, citizen representation
provided by NGOs, activist citizens, and law school legal aid centers
has diminished significantly, if not vanished completely. 42
Since Xi came to power, media has been under increasingly tight
control, NGOs are diminishing, and foreign funders and supporters are
placed under tight control and leaving; the crucial support structure for
human right lawyering is collapsing. 43 Human rights lawyers relied on
a legal complex composed of social media, NGOs and foreign
35. Fu Hualing & Richard Cullen, The Development of Public Interest Litigation in
China, in PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN ASIA 9, 16-7 (Po Jen Yap & Holning Lau ed.,
2010).
36. Tin Muk Daisy Cheung, Going Barefoot in the Middle Kingdom: A Preliminary Study
of the Strategic Choices of the Non-Licensed Weiquan Lawyers in Modern China, 1 UCLA
PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 7-8 (2013).
37. Id.
38. Pamela N. Phan, Clinical Legal Education in China: In Pursuit of a Culture of Law
and a Mission of Social Justice, 8 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 117, 145-6 (2005).
39. Fu & Cullen, supra note 35.
40. A revision of the Civil Procedure Law was adopted August 31, 2012 and came into
effect on January 1, 2013. See Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 2012, effective Jan. 1,
2013); Darcy Pan, Agents of Change or Status Quo? Labor NGOs in South China, in
UNCERTAIN TIMES: ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO LABOR IN A NEOLIBERAL WORLD
135, 144-5 (E. Paul Durrenberger ed., 2017).
41. Civil Procedure Law, art. 58.
42. See, e.g., Phan, supra note 38.
43. See Hualing Fu, Wielding the Sword: President Xi’s New Anti-Corruption Campaign,
in GREED, CORRUPTION, AND THE MODERN STATE: ESSAY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 134-60
(Susan Rose-Ackerman & Paul Lagunes eds., 2015).
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supporters. 44 Activist lawyers worked closely with social media to
publicize their cases and causes, without which lawyers cannot
mobilize support or interest in public opinions. 45 NGOs have been
indispensable partners for lawyers and the latter rely on NGOs for
reaching out to the communities, for liaising with litigants, and for
organizing litigation. 46 The diminishing or even vanishing NGO
sectors in China place the burden of organizing litigation on lawyers.
Finally, the control over foreign funding to NGOs and human rights
lawyers has delivered a significant blow to the human rights
advocacy. 47
Thirdly, there is the hostility impact. Human rights lawyers
remain lone fighters—spirited and courageous, but at an infant stage of
building solid alliance. 48 In particular, they have failed to seek
understanding and sympathy from state institutions and their link to the
state remains fragile if at all. 49 In social capital literature, linking refers
to the ability to create cooperative relations and build trust with official
institutions so to influence government decision-making. 50 Compared
to bridging, which aims at building horizontal ties between groups of
similar level of political power, linking is a means to build vertical ties
among groups from different hierarchical levels of power. 51 In the
context of human rights lawyering, linking refers mainly to the
possibility of meaningful dialogue and effective communication
between lawyers and a variety of government entities, including
political (Party organs), legislative (people’s congresses at various
levels), judicial (courts and procuratorates), and executive/professional
bodies (police, bureau of justice, bar associations). While Chinese
44. Fu, supra note 14.
45. See Han Zhu & Fu Hualing, Transparency as an Offence: Rights Lawyering for Open
Government Information in China, 12:2 J. OF COMP. L. 417, 426-31 (2017); Teng Biao, Rights
Defence (weiquan), Microblogs (weibo), and the Surrounding Gaze (weiguan): the Rights
Defence Movement Online and Offline, 3 CHINA PERSP. (2012).
46. Fu & Cullen, supra note 35, at 15.
47. Zheping Huang, NGOs are under Threat in China’s Latest Crackdown against
“Foreign Forces”, QUARTZ (Jan. 4, 2017), https://qz.com/873489/ngos-are-trying-to-stayalive-in-chinas-latest-crackdown-against-foreign-forces/ [https://perma.cc/5J3T-XVNF]; see
also Chongyi Feng, The NGO Law in China and its Impact on Overseas Funded NGOs, 3
COSMOPOLITAN CIV. SOCIETIES: AN INTERDISC. J. 95, 99 (2017).
48. See Pils, supra note 4, at 248-55.
49. Fu, supra note 1, at 11.
50 . See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000).
51. Id.

2018]

THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERING

1143

human rights lawyers are able to expand their community, build strong
and close ties among same-minded lawyers, and, to a lesser degree,
reach out and build alliances with media and NGOs, their relations with
the Party remain hostile. 52 The more they struggle, the more alienated
they are from the authorities. 53 When human rights lawyers look at the
Party–state in a wide spectrum, they see enemies. 54
Take weiquan lawyers and courts, the traditional partner in a
liberal legal complex, for instance. Traditional weiquan lawyers were
suspicious of legal institutions and treat courts as their adversaries
rather than as partners, which could be relied on in launching any public
interest legal action. 55 Courts in China are not independent, and judges
largely comply with political instructions from the Party-state. 56 In
sensitive cases in particular, judges often ignore legal rules and make
decisions for the sake of political expediency. 57 There is not a legal
complex in China in which lawyers—broadly defined to include
lawyers, judges, and prosecutors, among others—can form a liberalleaning alliance in fighting for a limited state and a large realm of
freedom. 58 In China, the state uses the courts to control the lawyers and
limit the public interest causes behind the litigation. 59
Not surprisingly, when Chinese lawyers suffer, they suffer at the
hands of their fellow professionals. It is the judges who limit the access
to justice for lawyers by refusing to accept claims for litigation. 60 It is
the judges who rule against public interest causes regardless of their
sound legal grounds. 61 When human rights lawyers are disciplined or
disbarred, it is often because these lawyers have launched an aggressive
defense in court and protested against unfair treatment and outright
illegality. 62

52. See generally Feng Chongyi et al., Rights Defence Lawyers as Dissidents in
Contemporary China, 3 INT’L J. CHINA STUD. 325, 332-340 (2012).
53. Id. at 334-35.
54. Id. at 332-40; Fu & Cullen, supra note 4, at 121-23.
55. Fu & Cullen, supra note 4, at 120-23; Fu, supra note 1, at 2.
56. RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW, 280-309
(2002).
57. Pils, supra note 4, at 104-40
58. Fu, supra note 14.
59. Pils, supra note 4, at 104-40.
60. Id. at 115-16; China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, supra note 15, at 39.
61. Fu Hualing, Embedded Socio-Legal Activism in China: The Case of Yirenping, 42
H.K L.J. 245, 267-68 (2012).
62. Pils, supra note 4, at 157-60.
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Finally, there is the Regulatory Impact. The crackdown does not
end when lawyers are sentenced to prison terms unfortunately. 63
Repression through criminal punishment, as we have witnessed during
the 709 crackdown, has transformed into preemptive regulation that
combines political monitoring and professional disciplines. 64
Institutionally, the site of control and resistance has moved from the
coercive security apparatus to regulation at multiple levels. 65
The crackdown triggered a round of regulatory reinforcement in
tearing down the support structure of human rights lawyering. 66 Courts
issued rules to reiterate the authority of judges in controlling court
order, the corresponding duty of lawyers and parties in obeying court
disciplines, and punishment for disturbing court order and harming
court safety 67 and for demonstrating against courts in areas surrounding
the courts. 68 The MoJ also enacted rules on the management of law
firms which creates a duty on law firms to monitor, manage and
discipline lawyers in the firm to prohibit lawyers to encourage and
organize clients to demonstrate in front of state organs. A wide range
of activities are now subject to professional discipline, including
making “misleading and distorting comments” on on-going cases;
organizing open letters in such cases to create public opinions to
scandalize and pressurize legal institutions; walking out in protest from
an ongoing trial; or disrupting court order including intimidating,
scandalizing or assaulting judicial personnel. Further political
restriction on legal advocacy includes any challenge to state
determination of cults; and mostly significantly, making and
forwarding statements that challenge the basic constitutional system
63. See China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, supra note 15, at 40-44.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Eva Pils, Written Submission on the Human Rights Situation in China—the
Crackdown on Human Rights Lawyers, CONSERVATIVE HUM. RTS (Apr. 2016),
http://www.conservativehumanrights.com/reports/submissions/Pils_Submission_on_Human_
Rights_Lawyer_Crackdown.pdf [https://perma.cc/QV9K-FZ9T].
67. See Guanyu Tuijin Shenpan Wei Zhongxin De Xingshi Susong Zhidu Gaige De Yijian
[Opinions on Advancing the Reform of the Trial-Centered Criminal Procedure System] (July 20,
2016), http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-28021.html [https://perma.cc/5P6U-BY8M]
(noting the issuance by the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and
the Ministry of Public Security).
68. See Renmin Faynan, Luoshi “Baohu Sifa Renyuan Yifa Lüxing Fading Zhize Guiding”
De Shishi Banfa, [The Implementation Measures for the People’s Courts to Implement the
Provisions on Protecting Judicial Personnel to Lawfully Perform Their Statutory Duties] (Feb.
7, 2017), http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-35572.html [https://perma.cc/QP9L-USM5]
(noting the issuance by the Supreme People’s Court).
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and endanger national security or using the Internet to incite
dissatisfaction of the Party and government. 69 Violation of the
prohibitive rules may lead to dismissal of the law firm. 70 The MoJ
rules, as stated above, are duly codified in January 2017 in the
Provisional Rules on Disciplining Members of Law Association for
Violation of Rules. 71
The MoJ moved quickly to discipline human rights lawyers using
a wide range of instruments ranging from warning, refusal to renew
practicing certificates suspending practices to disbarment. 72 While
repression through criminal law inflicted directly on lawyers by the
security forces has diminished and is sporadic, political control of the
professional regulators, which is more embedded, inside out, and
constant, has become the most significant challenge to the survival of
human rights lawyering. 73
Examples abound. Social media comments made by human rights
lawyers are routinely monitored, and Bureaus of Justice (“BoJ”)
officials have invited lawyers to tea who made comments that were
regarded as offensive, signed open letters or otherwise participated in
petitions, demanding deletion, retraction or other undertakings. 74
During officially sensitive period, officials from the BoJ in Beijing,
Wuhan, Changsha, Chengdu and many other provinces gave warnings
to lawyers for making critical comments on-line. 75 The consequence
for not complying could be serious. The activist lawyers who survived
the crackdown and who refused to be silenced are being disbarred or
69. See Art 50, Lüshi Shiwusuo Guanli Banfa [Measures for the Administration of Law
Firms] (Nov. 1, 2016), issued by the Ministry of Justice, http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/
2016/content_5109321.htm [https://perma.cc/BLE5-GQVF].
70. Id., art. 67.
71. See Art 34, Lüshi Xiehui Huiyuan Weigui Xingwei Chufen Guize (Shixing) [Rules for
Punishment of Members’ Misconduct (provisional)] (Jan. 8, 2017), (issued by the All China
Lawyers Association, Jan. 28, 2017), http://www.scslsxh.com/system/20171025/000002005.
html [https://perma.cc/RQ6E-NKWK].
72. See A Joint Statement to Strongly Condemn the Chinese Government’s Suppression
against Human Rights Lawyers through Revocation and Invalidation of Lawyers’ Licenses,
CHRLCG (June 6, 2018), http://www.chrlawyers.hk/en/content/【-joint-statement-stronglycondemn-chinese-government’s-suppression-against-human-rights [https://perma.cc/S6S5XP99].
73. Id.
74. All information was collected from the Monthly Brief on the Developments in Rights
and Interests of Chinese Lawyers and Chinese Human Rights Lawyers’ postings on social
media, LAW. RTS. AND INT. NETWORK [Zhongguo Lüshi Quanyi Dongtai Xinxi],
http://lvshiquanyiguanzhu.blogspot.hk [https://perma.cc/MTC3-CNN8] (last visited Mar. 22,
2018).
75. Id.
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suspended, largely for making comments critical of the Party, including
Wu Youshui (nine months suspension) in Huangzhou BoJ in 2017; Zhu
Shengwu (disbarred) in Shandong in 2017; Wang Liqian and Wang
Longde (disbarred) in Yunnan in 2017; Yu Wensheng (disbarred) in
Beijing in 2018; Sui Muqing (disbarred) in Guangzhou in 2018. The
list goes on and continues to grow. 76 Soon, the number of human rights
lawyers disbarred by BoJ officials will surpass that imprisoned during
the 709 crackdown. 77 Facing continuous state repression, professional
discipline, and vanishing support from their peers, the broader society
and legal institutions, the survival of human rights lawyering in China
is at risk and, even it continues, its contributions will be trivial. 78
III. COOPTATION
According to the Cooptation Thesis, the legal profession
including human rights lawyers may represent a powerful social force
that the Party needs to take seriously. 79 In the middle of the crackdown
on human rights lawyers, the Party is also implementing an
unprecedented legal reform to further institutionalize the court. 80 As
part of the legal reform, are more proactive and forceful in cooping
lawyers into the legal process as defined by courts and have engaged
lawyers with both sticks and carrots. 81 While using law and other
measures to punish, threaten and discipline lawyers, the Party-state is
also reaching out to lawyers to improve their relationship and build

76 . See Zhongguo Lüshi, Guanyu Zunzhong He Baozhang Lüshi Zhiye Quanli De
Shengming [Chinese Lawyers’ Statement on Respecting and Safeguarding Lawyers’ Right to
Practice], RTS. NET (Feb. 1, 2018), http://wqw2010.blogspot.hk/2018/02/blog-post.html
[https://perma.cc/E7QW-84UN].
77. A Joint Statement to Strongly Condemn the Chinese Government’s Suppression
against Human Rights Lawyers through Revocation and Invalidation of Lawyers’ Licenses,
supra note 72.
78. Yedu, supra note 18.
79. See Chen Youxi: Fazhi de Xianshi yu Qianzhan (Da Dushi Kuaibao Wen) [Chen
Youxi: Reality and Prospect of the Rule of Law (Interview with the City Express)] (Mar. 10,
2011), http://www.glawyer.net/article/180.html [https://perma.cc/F4LN-4K2W].
80 . See Hualing Fu, Building Judicial Integrity in China, 39) HASTINGS INT’L AND
COMPARATIVE L. REV. 167 (2016); Randall Peerenboom, Fly High the Banner of Socialist Rule
of Law with Chinese Characteristics!, 7 HAGUE J. ON THE RULE OF L. 49 (2015).
81. SEE YOU IN COURT, THE ECONOMIST 31-32 (Sept. 30, 2017).

2018]

THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERING

1147

trust. 82 Indeed, the official media was careful not to cast the net of
repression and condemnation too wide. 83
In the post-crackdown era, the Party has also sent some
conciliatory signals to placate the profession in general, and regulation
replaced repression. 84 Repression alone would never work in achieving
regime survival, and, in China’s authoritarian state, there is a
relationship of “contingent symbiosis” between the state and civil
society in which the state negotiates with society in reaching
compromises. 85 Lawyering, and for that matter, the legal system in its
entirety, 86 is a conservative enterprise that is firmly embedded in and
reinforces the existing political and legal order. 87 It operates largely
within a legal framework. 88 Persistent repression may drive die-hard
lawyers underground and radicalize human rights lawyers. 89 The Party
has proven adaptable to new challenges and remained resilient, 90 and
is able to capture emerging challenges through state-initiated legal
reform. 91

82. See, e.g., Zhang Jun: Lvxie Yao Tingzai Qianmian Ciqian Zhize Buming Zeren Zai
Women [Zhang Jun: Lawyers Associations Should Take the Lead and We Should Be Blamed for
the Unclear Obligations and Duties], LEGAL DAILY, (Aug. 31, 2017),
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/nd/2017-08-31/doc-ifykpuuh9917522.shtml
[https://perma.cc/HMF6-CRZ8].
83. See, e.g., Zheng Yan, Lvshi de Zhanchang Yingzai Fating [Lawyers’ Battlefield
should be in Court], PEOPLE’S DAILY (July 12, 2015), http://opinion.people.com.
cn/n/2015/0712/c1003-27290080.html; Wei Zhezhe, Ruhe Baozhang Lvshi Hefa Quanli [How
to Protect Lawyers’ Legal Rights?], PEOPLE’S DAILY 19 (Feb 7, 2018).
84. See, e.g., Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s
Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security and Other Departments on Legally Protecting
Lawyers’ Practicing Rights (Sept. 16, 2015); Wei, supra note 83.
85. Anthony J. Spires, Contingent Symbiosis and Civil Society in an Authoritarian State:
Understanding the Survival of China’s Grassroots NGIS, 117 AM. J. OF SOC. 1 (2011).
86. See Kwai Hang Ng & He Xin, EMBEDDED COURTS: JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING IN
CHINA (2017).
87. For the political embeddedness of lawyers in China, see Ethan Michelson, Lawyers,
Political Embeddedness, and Institutional Continuity in China’s Transition from Socialism, 113
(2) AM. J. OF SOC. 459 (2007); Liu & Halliday, supra note 6.
88. Fu & Cullen, supra note 4, at 112, 116-20.
89. Fu & Cullen, supra note 4, at 57-58.
90. See Andrew J. Nathan, Authoritarian Resilience, 14 J. DEMOCRACY 6 (2003); DAVID
SHAMBAUGh, CHINA’S COMMUNIST PARTY: ATROPHY AND ADAPTATION (2008).
91. See Carl Minzner, Legal Reform in the Xi Jinpng Era, 20 ASIAN POLICY 4, 4-9
(2015); Fu Hualing, Politiczed Challenges, Depoliticized Responses: Political Monitoring in
China’s Transitions, in Surveillance, in COUNTER-TERRORISM AND COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM 296-312 (Fergal Davis et al., eds., 2014); See You in Court, supra note
81.
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Lawyers may dissent, but in the end, legal reform is able to absorb
the energies that the legal profession may release and eventually silence
or tame those challenging voices in the bar. The triviality thesis is
wrong in that it presumes that the Party is hostile to the causes that
human rights lawyers advocate and punish lawyers because the Party
fundamentally disagrees with the ideas that those lawyers stand for.
Following that logic, since the Party had Xu Zhiyong convicted for
organizing demonstrations to demand equal right to education for
migrant children, then the Party must be hostile to the substantive idea
that Xu and his comrades struggled for. If the Party had lawyers and
labor NGOs punished for organizing collective bargaining, then
collective bargaining must be something that the Party is hostile to or
uncomfortable with.
The difficulty with this reasoning is that the Party has a variety of
individuals punished for multiple reasons including blowing the
whistle against corruption, campaigning against sexual harassment in
public transport, and advocating for equality rights or government
transparency. 92 Most of the causes that lawyers were punished for have
also been on the reform agenda of the Party. 93 The hostility, upon closer
examination, is directed not against the ideas qua ideas, but the
individuals who assert a representative role over the matter and the way
they went about in putting them into practice. 94
There is often a consensus between the Party and its “enemies”
that there is an urgent need for certain policy reform, and their fight, to
a large degree, is over the ownership of the issue, pace of reform, and
the proper methodology that can be used to solve the problem. 95 It is
often the case that once the fight is over and lawyers are put away, the
Party would soon initiate reform that the lawyers demanded and were
punished for. 96 The Party initiated anti-corruption campaigns after
having lawyers and others punished for exposing corruption and
demanding enforcement, passed rules to discipline police after having
sanctioned lawyers and others who campaigned against police abuse of

92. See Pils, supra note 20, at 51; Leta Hong Fincher, China’s Feminist Five, 4 DISSENT
84-90 (2016).
93. See, e.g., Fu Hualing, Wielding the Sword: President Xi’s New Anti-Corruption
Campaign, in GREED, CORRUPTION, AND THE MODERN STATE 134-158 (2015); Fincher, supra
note 92.
94. Id.
95. Fu, supra note 93, at 147-8.
96. Id.
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power, 97 and implemented collective bargaining and started to reform
official unions immediately after having people imprisoned for
advocating the very ideas. 98
The Party is willing to implement some reform that lawyers
advocate, and lawyers are a crucial part of the process. 99 But lawyers’
participation has to be managed and placed under the firm hands of
Party. In essence, it is the Party’s reform, and thus should be properly
credited to, and carried out under, the leadership and guidance of the
Party, and according to a pace as the Party sees fit.
What are the cooptation strategies? First of all, the Party has,
through prosecution and public censure, separated hard-core weiquan
lawyers from other types of human rights lawyers, especially the diehard lawyers in the criminal bar. 100 In justifying the 709 crackdown,
the People’s Daily, for example, made a distinction between die-hard
lawyers who advocated forcefully inside the court and those who
mobilized aggressively outside the court. 101 While it condemned extrajudicial activism harshly, it expressed certain respect for lawyers who
pushed the legal limit within the court. 102 More recently, Xiong
Xuanguo, a Vice Minister of the MoJ, openly congratulated die-hard
lawyers for contributions in the overturning of a number of high profile
wrongful conviction cases. 103 Similarly, Zhang Jun, the former
Minister of Justice replacing the disgraced Wu Aiying, praised Tian
Wenchang, a leading criminal lawyer known for his courage and skills
97. For instance, in December 2016 the Chinese authorities proposed to amend the 1996
Police Law to specify the circumstances under which police can use firearms. Dong Heng, Draft
Law Includes First Gun Use Rules for Police, SIX TONE (Dec. 5, 2016),
http://www.sixthtone.com/news/1645/rules-gun-use-chinese-police-put-draft-law
[https://perma.cc/SK3T-QEQF].
98. See Stefan Brehm, Collective Bargaining: New Hope for China’s Workers?, INST. FOR
SECURITY & DEV. POL’Y (Mar. 31, 2017), http://isdp.eu/publication/collective-bargaining-newhope-china/ [https://perma.cc/6KX3-TT6A].
99. See, e.g., Keith J. Hand, Citizens Engage the Constitution: The Sun Zhigang Incident
and Constitutional Review Proposals in the People’s Republic of China, in BUILDING THE
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA 221-42 (Stephanie Balme & Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2009).
100. See, e.g., Zou Wei & Huang Qiangchang, Jiekai “Weiquan” Shijian de Heimu
[Exposing the Dark Inside of “Weiquan” Incidents], PEOPLE’S DAILY (Jul. 12, 2015); Zheng,
supra note 83.
101. Zheng, supra note 83.
102. Id.
103. Mr. Xiong said that “the profession and the entire society” recognized lawyers’
significant role. See Lin Zizhen, Xiong Xuanguo: Chongfen Zunzhong Lvshi Yijian Neng Bimian
Yuan’an [Xiong Xuanguo: Fully Respecting Lawyers’ Opinions Can Avoid Wrongful
Convictions], CAIXIN, (Apr. 27, 2017), http://m.china.caixin.com/m/2017-04-27/
101083751.html [https://perma.cc/39C5-MMKL] (last visited March 22, 2018).
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in representing sensitive cases in the 1990s, as a true die-hard
lawyer. 104
Lawyer-official meetings seem a regular practice. 105 Upon
assuming duty, the Chief Justice, Zhou Qiang, also made some
symbolic gestures to patch up relations. 106 The Chief Justice has
repeatedly spoken on the importance of legal representation in the
judicial process and the need for courts to respect lawyers and take
seriously their submissions. 107 He said that respecting lawyers and
relying on lawyers (and legal scholars) has significant instrumental and
normative values. 108 The legal profession is an integral part of the legal
community, and, as such, cooperative relations with and high trust from
lawyers are indispensable for the court to build and restore its
credibility and legitimacy. 109 The court reform is still on-going and
expanding in both depth and scope, lawyers, who were allowed only to
shout at the system from outside, may have better opportunities to
reform the system from within, if lawyers are willing to adopt, tonedown their rhetoric and, in particular, accept the political reality. 110
The former Minister of Justice, Zhang Jun, following the example
of the Chief Justice, tried to send a reconciliatory message to all human
rights lawyers by meeting with more than fifty lawyers upon assuming
office. 111 Unlike the Chief Justice, Zhang met lawyers from a wide
range of political stances including weiquan lawyers, such as Li
Fangping and Chen Jiangang, whose critical views of the government
have been well known. 112 During the meeting, Zhang openly
104 . See Jiang Anjie, 68 Wei Xingbian Lvshi Shouci Yu Buzhang Mianduimian [68
Criminal Lawyers Meeting with Minister of Justice for the First Time], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL
DAILY] (Aug. 29, 2017), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/leader/content/2017-08/29/content_
7298802.htm [https://perma.cc/YM8U-F7TL].
105. Monthly Brief on the Developments in Rights and Interests of Chinese Lawyers,
supra note 74.
106. See The Supreme People’s Court, Quan Shehui Gongtong Nvli Tuijin Zhengsifa
Tisheng Sifa Gongxinli [The Whole Society Works Hard to Promote Fair Justice and Enhance
Judicial Credibility], COURTS.GOV (April 27, 2013), http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing7783.html [https://perma.cc/R5VT-6AVP].
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Zheng, supra note 83.
111. Liu Ziyang, Xingshi Bianhu Lvshi Changyishu Dansheng Ji [The Production of a
Proposal Made by the Criminal Lawyers], LEGAL DAILY (Sep. 2, 2017),
http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/index/content/2017-09/01/content_7304375.htm?node=20908
[https://perma.cc/7FU9-GQ8F].
112. Id.
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complained about the facts that security forces in the past detained
lawyers without properly notifying the MoJ and promised to provide a
“home” for lawyers in trouble. 113
Taking their cue from Beijing, Lawyers’ Associations in Beijing,
Guangzhou and elsewhere have, since May 2017, reached out to
weiquan lawyers who are members of the respective lawyer’s
associations to solicit critical views of associations. 114 The
conversation between Chen Jiangang and Cheng Hai (who represent
Wang Quanzhang, one of the lawyers detained during the 709
crackdown) and the President of Beijing Lawyers’ Association, Gao
Zicheng, illustrated the willingness on the part of the MoJ to make a
change. 115 Cheng Hai and Chen Jiangang complained about the failure
on the part of Beijing Lawyers’ Association to offer effective
protection of the rights of its members and, in particular, the lack of
legal defense in the case of Wang Quanzhang. 116 Interestingly, that
conversation led to a subtle reply from the Beijing Lawyers Association
that the Lawyers Association of Tianjin, where Wang had been
detained, would offer assistance on the matter. 117 And a few weeks
later, a controversial meeting between lawyer Chen Youxi and Wang
occurred. 118
It seems possible that the MoJ arranged that surprising but
significant meeting between Chen and Wang to demonstrate that the
MoJ’s new leadership could make a difference and also that lawyers
could participate in even the most sensitive case under the new
leadership. The meeting proved to be highly controversial and drove
another wedge between weiquan lawyers and die-hard lawyers, and
113. See Zhang Jun: Lawyers Associations Should Take the Lead and We Should Be
Blamed for the Unclear Obligations and Duties supra note 82.
114. See, e.g., 2017 Nian 6 Yuefen de Zhongguo Lüshi Quanyi Dongtai Xinxi [Monthly
Brief on the Developments in Rights and Interests of Chinese Lawyers (June 2017)], LAW.
RTS. AND INT. NETWORK, http://lvshiquanyiguanzhu.blogspot.hk [https://perma.cc/Z5EW28AR] (last visited June 16, 2018).
115. See Cheng Hai, Lvshi Chenghai He Chen Jiangang Yingyue Yu Beijing Lvshi Xiehui
Gao Zicheng Huizhang Deng Huimian [Lawyers Cheng Hai and Chen Jiangang Met with the
President of Beijing Lawyers Association Gao Zicheng] (June 6, 2017),
http://lvshiquanyiguanzhu.blogspot.hk/2017/06/blog-post_6.html
[https://perma.cc/7CFX4SNK].
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See Chen Youxi, “Guanpai Lvshi” Bude Bushuo De Jiju Hua [Some Words the
“State-appointed” Lawyer Has to Say], SINA (July 26, 2017), http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_
63aeaff70102x764.html [https://perma.cc/FKQ6-Z73V].
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created another split between human rights lawyers who are allegedly
officially appointed working within the system and for the system and
those who remain independent. 119 Chen Youxi was a well-known sike
lawyer, who developed his fame as a leading sike lawyer for his defense
of lawyer Li Zhuang during Bo Xilai’s rule in Chongqing. 120 Chen,
however, while remaining faithful to the sike tradition, later developed
a reputation for cooperating with investigators and prosecutors and for
his willingness to work with, instead of working against, the
government in hard cases. 121 Chen Youxi had shown little interest in
the 709 cases in general and the arranged meeting with Wang,
regardless of who was behind the decision, proved to be offensive to
all the weiquan lawyers who had been fighting hard for Wang’s cause
ever since his highly secretive detention. 122 The All China Lawyers
Association (ACLA) had to make a public statement that lawyers are
equal members under the Lawyers Law and no such division exists
between lawyers who are inside the system and those who are
without. 123
Second, the MoJ has become more forceful and assertive in
regulating the profession, with the law associations playing a proactive
role in making a more effective regulatory system. 124 Whether the joint
efforts by the MoJ and the subsidiary ACLA can create a “home” for
lawyers, potentially a shelter for lawyers in trouble, is difficult to see.
At least the Ministry has openly shown that they are not pleased and
uncomfortable with security overreach and complain that security

119. Li Ruohan, Lawyer Warns Colleagues to Avoid Illegal Means to Address Injustice
as Case Sparks Debate, GLOBAL TIMES (Jul. 27, 2017), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/
1058424.shtml [https://perma.cc/YNF5-XUPK]; see also Chen supra note 115.
120. Fu, supra note 1, at 4-6.
121. Xie Wenting, Veteran Lawyer Brushes off Criticism of being a ‘Toady,’ ‘Fencesitter’, GLOBAL TIMES (Aug. 11, 2017), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1060916.shtml
[https://perma.cc/GA9N-MXZL].
122. Mimi Lau, The Chinese Lawyer who Vanished Two Years Ago and the Only Man
who’s Seen Him since, SCMP (July 26, 2017), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policiespolitics/article/2104246/missing-human-rights-lawyer-good-health-tianjin
[https://perma.cc/YBD6-Z5WH]; also see Chen, supra note 115.
123. See Lüshi Xiangyou Tongdeng Quanli Yiwu Bu Cunzai Renhe Paibie [Lawyers Share
the Same Rights and Obligations and No Factions Exist], MINISTRY OF JUST. OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Aug. 25, 2017), http://www.moj.gov.cn/2017/0825/5666.html
[https://perma.cc/NP6T-N8X5].
124. E.g., the 2017 Amendment of the Lawyer’s Practice Code of Conduct issued by the
ACLA includes new courtroom discipline rules, WAIZI, http://www.waizi.org.cn/doc/24973.
html [https://perma.cc/R6Q9-XHDX] (last visited July 14, 2018).
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detained lawyers without notifying the MoJ before detention of lawyers
was proved. 125
In doing so, the MoJ may be sending out a message to both sides,
lawyers and their minders, that it is in charge and has to be taken
seriously. On the one hand, the MoJ reminds the security forces of its
authority as the regulator of lawyers, and therefore its review on action
taken against lawyers should be properly sought and respected. While
this intra-government communication is not visible, it can be inferred
from public statements made by MoJ officials, including their critical
view of a security overreach and the newly found confidence and
assertion of authority on the part of the MoJ in their dealing with other
legal institutions such as the SPC and the public security. 126
On the other hand, the MoJ is tightening the regulation of the legal
profession and enhancing the disciplinary capacity of law associations
and law firms over individual lawyers, leading to promulgation of a
series of prohibitive rules and measures to rein in the out-of-courts
speech and extra-legal activism of lawyers. 127 Those rules and
measures are regarded as repressive—even more so than the 709
crackdown because it lowers the threshold of controls by punishing
mere speech of lawyers, and because the ultimate punishment—that is
disbarment— is harsh. 128 Naturally those new rules and measures have
received much critical attention by lawyers and commentors, who
argue that an assertive MoJ has not helped lawyers as it claims. 129 On
the contrary, it has become another oppressor which controls lawyers
at a much closer distance. It is therefore hard to reconcile the repressive
professional control over law firms and lawyers and some of the
repressive episodes, as outlined above, with MoJ’s claim that it tightens
the discipline out of its “deeply-felt care for lawyers,” implying that it

125. See Sifabu Shuli Muqian Lvshi Zhiye Quanli Baozhang Cunzai de Shida Wenti
[Ministry of Justice Identified Ten Issues in Protestation of Laywer’s Rights to Practice],
PEOPLE.CN, (Apr. 26, 2017), http://legal.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0426/c42510-29238119.html
[https://perma.cc/Y5F2-7BWX].
126. Id.
127. See Pils, supra note 66.
128. See Revised Measures on Law Firm Further Curb Independence of Chinese Lawyers
(9/21-10/3, 2016), CHINA HUM. RTS. BRIEFING (Oct. 3, 2016),
https://www.nchrd.org/2016/10/chrb-revised-measures-on-law-firms-further-curbindependence-of-chinese-lawyers-921-103-2016/ [https://perma.cc/3Q2Y-JVA7]; see also A
Joint Statement to Strongly Condemn the Chinese Government’s Suppression against Human
Rights Lawyers through Revocation and Invalidation of Lawyers’ Licenses, supra note 72.
129. Id.
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punishes lawyers and puts the house in order to preempt further
repression from the security forces. 130
Finally, the continuous promotion of legal reform in the post-709
era is creating more space in the legal system to make lawyering more
meaningful and effective. Some of the changes are substantial to coopt
lawyers into the institutional process. Three examples can highlight the
efforts to bring lawyers into the legal process and make lawyers’
participation more meaningful and effective.
The first is the increase in legal aid budget to improve access to
lawyers. 131 As the rule of law project in China, as the Party defines it,
continues, 132 government legal aid funding continues to grow. The
Party has demonstrated a strong political determination to expand the
legal aid system and also the financial capacity to do so. 133 In 2015, for
example, the Party’s General Office and that of the State Council, two
key policy-making bodies in China’s political structure, jointly issued
a document entitled Opinions on Improving the Legal Aid System
(Opinions). The Opinions demanded concrete measures to be taken to
channel disputes and conflicts into the legal process through the
expansion of legal aid to disputes involving labor, family, food and
medicine, education and medical care; they also require the creation of
a duty lawyer scheme in courts and detention centers. 134 For those who
promote legal aid in China, the Party has offered a target list of
commitments. 135 The State’s 13th Five Year Plan further undertakes the
improvement of general public services and has included legal aid
service as part of the larger public services that the government is dutybound to provide. 136 The legal aid budget from both the central and
local levels have increased on par with the growth of the Chinese GDP,
130. See Ministry of Justice Identified Ten Issues in Protestation of Lawyer’s Rights to
Practice, supra note 125.
131. China Calls for More Lawyer Participation in Legal Aid, XINHUANET, (Mar. 10,
2017), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-03/10/c_136118966.htm
[https://perma.cc/5DNK-L5YE].
132. Albert H.Y. Chen, China’s Long March towards Rule of Law or China’s Turn
against Law?, 4 THE CHINESE J. COMP. L. 1, 24-25 (2016).
133. Id.
134. See Guanyu Wanshan Falü Yuanzhu Zhidu de Yijian [Opinions on Perfecting the
Legal Aid System], XINHAUNET (June 20, 2015), http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/201506/29/c_1115759994.htm [https://perma.cc/HH96-8BTT].
135. Id.
136 . See THE 13TH FIVE YEARS PLAN OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
DEVELOPMENT OF PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Ch. 75 § 4, (Mar. 17, 2016)
http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201612/P020161207645765233498.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5
TP-LR54].
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and the amount of case subsidies that the government pays per case
have also increased correspondingly. 137 Beyond broader rule of law
promotion, the Party is also increasing public spending on public
services to improve the livelihood of the poor with specific reference
to the constitutional right of equality for all. 138
Secondly, with the improvement in legal aid, the SPC is in the
process of making it legally compulsory to provide defense in every
criminal case unless a defendant decides otherwise. 139 With the right
to defense in criminal cases being regarded as a core human right, the
central government is strongly incentivized to improve access to
lawyers in criminal cases as soon as the police finish their first round
of interrogation. 140 In a new pilot project in eight provinces, the MoJ
and SPC have provided comprehensive legal aid coverage for all
criminal cases at trial, on appeal and for post-conviction reviews where
the defendant has no legal representative. 141 The court is invested with
the duty to inform a competent legal aid center and failure to notify
where this leads to the deprivation of the defendant’s right to lawyer
“shall” result in the appellant court automatically quashing the
conviction and remanding the case for a retrial. 142
Finally, to take one step further, the Party has promoted class
action and public interest litigation (PIL) that is controlled by the
government and led by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) to
channel collective disputes back to the courts for legal resolution. 143 To
137. See DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AID WORK OF THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, JIANQUAN
FALV YUANZHU ZHIDU DIAOYAN BAOGAO HUIBIAN [COLLECTION OF RESEARCH REPORTS
FOR LEGAL AID SYSTEM IMPROVEMENT] (2014).
138. See The Press Conference of the Ministry of Justice on the Opinions on Improving
Legal Aid System, XINHUANET (June 30, 2015), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/201506/30/c_127966971.htm [https://perma.cc/K7G6-YGMF].
139. Zhang Yan, All Criminal Cases to Have Defense Lawyers, CHINA DAILY, (Jan. 19,
2018),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201801/19/WS5a613083a3106e7dcc1352ce.html
[https://perma.cc/5CMB-3FAS].
140. Id.
141. See Zuigaofa Sifabu Lianhe Chutai Banfa Kaizhan Xingshi Anjian Lvshi Bianhu
Quanfugai Shidian [The Ministry of Justice and the Supreme People’s Court Jointly Issuing
Measures to Offer Blanket Coverage of Legal Aid by Lawyers for Criminal cases], XINHUANET
(Oct.
12,
2017),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-10/12/c_129719121.htm
[https://perma.cc/NG3V-MV5W].
142. Id.
143. See Dimitri de Boer & Douglas Whitehead, Opinion: The Future of Public Interest
Litigation in China, CHINADIALOGUE (Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.chinadialogue.net/article/
show/single/en/9356-Opinion-The-future-of-public-interest-litigation-in-China
[https://perma.cc/467R-6ZNM]; King & Wood Mallesons, Trends in Class Action-Type Public
Interest Litigation in China, CHINA LAW INSIGHT (May 29, 2015), https://www.chinalawinsight.
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take oxygen out of the fire of the human rights lawyers-led social-legal
activism, this SPP-led PIL reform, in particular, aims to create more
space in the judicial system to bring collective disputes to the courts.144
There are abundant mass disputes affecting the rights and interests of
particular groups of people, which have failed to reach the courts for
legal resolution. 145 And with the assistance of human rights lawyers
and NGOs, these groups have increasingly resorted to non-institutional,
extra-legal measures to assert their rights. 146 The refocusing of the legal
system on class action and PIL expects to bring mass disputes from
streets to the courtroom-- a process that is likely to undermine the
mobilization capacity of weiquan lawyers and at the same time to
provide further opportunities for rule-based legal advocacy within the
legal process. 147
IV. RESILIENCE
Finally, there is a more optimistic Resilience Thesis. 148 There is
always a debate on the degree to which human rights lawyers should
engage with the legal system and whether lawyers should act merely as
legal technicians arguing narrow legal issues in courts or should
broaden the horizon and take a wider political-legal view. 149 Should
lawyers merely rely on law, use law proactively in a dynamic fashion
or should they challenge law’s vulnerability to de-legitimize the
underlining political system? 150 This has been the lingering question
com/2015/05/articles/intellectual-property/trends-in-class-action-type-public-interestlitigation-in-china/ [https://perma.cc/EAC5-QKA9]
144. Id.
145. Pils, supra note 4, at 124-7.
146. Id. at 136-40.
147. See Fu Hualing, What Future is There for Human Rights Lawyering in China?, 2
MADE IN CHINA 12, 15 (2017); See You in Court, supra note 81.
148. See, e.g., Han Zhu, Law-Oriented Lawyering vs. Political Lawyering: A Comparative
Study of Mainland China, Taiwan and South Korea, 48(2) H.K.L.J (forthcoming, 2018); The
China Human Rights Lawyers Group: Statement Upon the 2nd Anniversary of the 709
Anniversary of the 709 Incident, CHRLCG (Jul. 11, 2017), http://www.chrlawyers.
hk/en/content/ 【 forward 】 -china-human-rights-lawyers-group-statement-upon-2ndanniversary-709-incident [https://perma.cc/YP4Z-8C6L]; Statement of Teng Biao at the
Hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (June 28, 2017),
https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/CECC%20Hearing%20-%2028
june17%20-%20709%20Lawyers%20-%20Teng%20Biao.pdf [https://perma.cc/29F8-UMZQ].
149. See generally Eva Pils, Asking the Tiger for His Skin: Rights Activism in China, 30
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1209-87 (2007).
150. See Fu Hualing, Human Rights Lawyering in Chinese Courtrooms, 2 CHINESE J.
COMP. L. 270 (2014).
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challenging lawyers’ professional ethics and political resolve before
and after the crackdown. 151 What happens if law is limited in achieving
lawyers’ ambition and what would be the alternatives? There are
radically different views, and harsh criticisms continue to be made by
human rights lawyers against one another for their differences. 152
Lawyers will not be silenced, marginalized or coopted as an integral
part of the regime. 153 With that independent spirit as the backdrop,
some human rights lawyers will continue to push the boundaries that
have been set by the Party. 154 There is nothing new about crackdown
on lawyers 155 even though the most recent one is more severe one in
both the harshness of penalty and the scope of prosecution. 156 But
human right lawyers prove to be resilient and always return with
vengeance after a crackdown. 157
At a foundational level, China remains unchanged on two
significant issues and the ground that produced weiquan lawyers in the
past will continue to work in their reproduction.
First, the social and economic background that created the
weiquan lawyers in the first place continue to exist. Abuse of power
and scandals that shocked the conscience of weiquan lawyers and
motivated them to take the identity of human rights defenders remain
in existence, and they will continue to reproduce dedicated human
rights defenders as they did. 158 If the persecution of Falun Gong
151. See Fu, supra note 147.
152. See, e.g., Yan, supra note 2; Chen, supra note 2; Pils, supra note 149.
153. See The China Human Rights Lawyers Group: Statement Upon the 2nd Anniversary
of the 709 Anniversary of the 709 Incident, supra note 148.
154. See Albert Ho Chun-yan, Xuyan [Prologue], in ZHONGGUO WEIQUAN LVSHI JIQI
YIHUO [CHINESE RIGHTS LAWYERS AND THEIR FELLOWS].
155 . See Committee to Support Chinese Lawyers, Legal Advocacy and the 2011
Crackdown in China: Adversity, Repression, and Resilience, http://www.csclawyers.org/letters/
Legal%20Advocacy%20and%20the%202011%20Crackdown%20in%20China.pdf
[https://perma.cc/333H-R85F]; Pils, supra note 4, at 189-226.
156. The China Human Rights Lawyers Group: Statement Upon the 2nd Anniversary of
the 709 Anniversary of the 709 Incident, supra note 148; see also China Human Rights
Lawyers Concern Group, supra note 15, at 53-62.
157. The China Human Rights Lawyers Group: Statement Upon the 2nd Anniversary of
the 709 Anniversary of the 709 Incident, supra note 148; Albert Ho Chun-yan, supra note 154;
Fu, supra note 151, at 14-15.
158. See, e.g., H. Christoph Steinhardt & Fengshi Wu, In the Name of the Public:
Environmental Protest and the Changing Landscape of Popular Contention in China, 75 THE
CHINA J. 61-82 (2015); A ChinaFile Conversation: What Is the Significance of China’s
#MeToo Movement?, CHINAFILE (Mar. 20, 2018), http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/
what-significance-of-chinas-metoo-movement [https://perma.cc/589F-5X3P].
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practitioners made lawyer Gao Zhisheng, 159 systematic discrimination
and radical responses against the discriminatory rules and practices
nurtured Lu Jun, 160 Sun Zhigang’s death created Teng Biao and Xu
Zhiyong, 161 and Deng Yujiao’s self-help confirmed Xia Lin and others’
identity as human rights defenders, then all those abuses continue to
exist and will work to catalyze another radicalizing process. 162
Wrongful conviction, wide-spread discriminatory practices and
political and religious prosecution are at work in reproducing a new
generation of human rights lawyers. 163 To its credit, the Party has been
successful in its governance reform to reduce inequality, enhance
legality, and rein in abusive and powerful local officials to control the
level of social tension. 164 But the authoritarian nature of the Partystate—for example, its intolerance of an independent space for religion
and labor and consequently a need to control religion and prohibit
independent labor movement—necessarily creates challengers to its
system. 165
Second, the traditional dilemma of authoritarian legality remains
intact. On the one hand, the Party continues to promote legal rights,
enhance the capacity of judicial organs in dispute resolution and
develop rules-based governance in social and economic matters. 166 As
mentioned above, legal aid is improving, access to justice is improving,
and ordinary justice is improving. 167 As long as the regime promotes
the rule of law as a key governance strategy, law will empower lawyers
in their struggle for better protection of rights and for effective
accountability. Law, even in China, offers promises, generates hope,
and incentivizes action. 168 As long as legal rights are officially
pronounced and procedures in place for their implementation,
159. See Pils, supra note 149, at 1227-1223.
160. See generally Fu supra note 61.
161. See generally Keith Hand, Using Law for a Righteous Purpose: The Sun Zhigang
Incident and Evolving Forms of Citizen Action in the People’s Republic of China, 45 COLUM. J.
OF TRANSNAT’L L. 114 (2006).
162. See Fu & Cullen, supra note 3.
163. Fu, supra note 1, at 7-12.
164. Chen, supra note 132, at 15-27.
165. See, e.g., Fenggang Yang, From Cooperation to Resistance: Christian Responses to
Intensified Suppression in China Today, 15 FAITH & INT’L AFF. 79-90 (2017); Ivan
Franceschini & Elisa Nesossi, State Repression of Chinese Labor NGOs: A Chilling Effect?,
80 THE CHINA J. 111-29 (2018).
166. Chen, supra note 132, at 15-27.
167. Chen, supra note 132, at 24-25; See You in Court, supra note 81.
168. Pils, supra note 20, at 15-20, 32-51; Kevin J. O’Brien, Rightful Resistance, 1
WORLD POL. 31-55 (1996).
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aggrieved individuals will make corresponding claims and rights
lawyers will seize the opportunity and step forward to use law to hold
the regime accountable. This is part of the professional DNA and a right
that the Party cannot deny.
On the other hand, the regime’s commitment to law is partial and
limited and law’s full potential as an autonomous force is something
the Party is deeply concerned with. 169 The Party will become repressive
if legal claims and lawyers’ legal mobilization are collective and
organized and regarded as politically challenging and risky to the
Party’s legitimacy and effectiveness. 170 The Party promotes rights and
implements law but only to the degree it sees fit, and once the boundary
is crossed, it can mobilize its repressive apparatus to crash the
challenge. 171 Therefore, conscience-shocking episodes, unfulfilled
legal promises and political intolerance, in combination, may be the
best recipe for the creation of weiquan lawyering. Human rights
lawyers are the ones who test the uncertain boundary at the social-legal
frontiers. That dynamic worked in the past in catalyzing a rights
movement and the same dynamic will continue to produce a generation
of human rights lawyers. 172
Extra-legal mobilization is necessary and unavoidable to address
past wrong or to seek future transformation. 173 There remain many
circumstances in which weiquan lawyers, together with other activists,
have to confront with the system directly by organizing street
protests. 174 Many of the cases that triggered mobilization may not be
justiciable, such as the extra-legal detention of Falun Gong members
and political dissidents, the massive censorship as applied online and
offline, or lack of political accountability as in the case of demanding
169. See generally TOM GINSBURG & TAMIR MOUSTAFA, RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS
COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES (2008); Tamir Moustafa, Law and Courts in
Authoritarian Regimes, 10 ANN. REV. L. AND SOC. SCI. 281 (2014); Mark Tushnet,
Authoritarian Constitutionalism, 2 CORNELL L. REV. 391 (2015); Peter H. Solomon, Courts and
Judges in Authoritarian Regimes, 60 WORLD POL. 122 (2007); MARY E. GALLAGHER,
AUTHORITARIAN LEGALITY IN CHINA: LAW WORKERS, AND THE STATE (2017).
170. See Fu, supra note 14.
171. See Pils, supra note 20 , at 32-54; Pils, supra note 4, at 265-266.
172. Fu & Cullen, supra note 3; The China Human Rights Lawyers Group: Statement
Upon the 2nd Anniversary of the 709 Anniversary of the 709 Incident, supra note 148.
173. Pils, supra note 4, at 136-140; Zhu & Fu, supra note 45, at 426-434.
174. See, e.g., Wife of Detained Chinese Lawyer ‘Silent’ for 1,000 Days Begins 60-Mile
March in Serarch of Answers, SCMP (Apr. 4, 2018), http://www.scmp.com/news/china/
policies-politics/article/2140248/wife-detained-chinese-lawyer-silent-1000-days-begins-60 [
https://perma.cc/GX8V-SYY2]; Zhu & Fu, supra note 45, at 432-34.
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disclosure of assets of officials, are, essentially, political. 175 They can
only be challenged through a political process and, in the Chinese
circumstances, the only political channel available is public
demonstration of anger, public shaming of officials and public demand
for accountability. 176 Indeed, in spite of the on-going legal reform,
many human rights lawyers remain disillusioned with the entire legal
process and may be ready to opt for a political confrontation. 177 For
them, public exposure of systematic wrongs and open expression of
common grievances are both rights and virtues regardless of their
utilities. 178 They argue that if the political system is the root cause of
the social problem, then lawyers should have the honesty and courage
to make it explicit in their legal advocacy. 179
But in the eyes of the Party, however, lawyers are slowly sliding
to the political end of the mobilization spectrum, and, especially with
foreign funding and involvement, have embarked on a color revolution
against the Party’s political power. 180 Frustrated with the legal
constraints in the Chinese legal process and fearful of the crackdown,
some human rights lawyers and other activists have scattered into
communities and started the painstaking and potentially long process
of social empowerment and mobilization. 181 As mentioned above,
human rights lawyers have, in the past, begun to play a meaningful role
in building civil society capacity by offering training, enhancing
awareness, designing strategies and taking part in or leading sociallegal action. 182 In doing so, human rights lawyers are becoming
movement leaders and spokespersons or even representative of certain
social groups. 183 Instead of giving legal advice, lawyers have joined the
causes of, and taken the same identity as, the groups they seek to
175. See generally, Eva Pils, From Independent Lawyer Group to Civic Opposition: The
Case of China’s New Citizen Movement, 1 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. & POL’Y J. 110-52 (2017).
176. Zhu & Fu, supra note 45, at 426-34.
177. Xie Yanyi, 709 Jishi yu Heping Minzhu 100 Wen [A Record of 709 and 100
Questions about Peaceful Democracy], http://www.rosechina.net/jd/szrd/2017-0905/9209.html [https://perma.cc/7RCC-4BSX];Yan, supra note 2; The China Human Rights
Lawyers Group: Statement Upon the 2nd Anniversary of the 709 Anniversary of the 709
Incident, supra note 148.
178. Han Zhu, Social Movement and the Law in Contemporary China: A Comparative
Approach (2016) 197, 204 (Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Hong Kong).
179. Pils, supra note 4, at 127-130.
180. Zou & Huang, supra note 100.
181. Fu, supra note 151, at 15.
182. Fu, supra note 1, at 10-12.
183. Id.
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represent. 184 Lawyers have immersed themselves in a movement and
play certain leading and organizing roles in articulating and asserting
rights and interests on behalf of certain social groups. 185
Human right lawyers in China are not irrelevant as the triviality
thesis suggests and cannot be simply ignored. Repression remains a
core component in the regime governance strategy, but repression
alone cannot produce good governance, especially in dealing with part
of the legal profession. 186 Human rights lawyers cannot be effectively
captured either, as the corporatist thesis would has us believe, because
human rights lawyers subscribe to a different value system, which is
fundamentally incompatible with the existing political and legal
order. 187
The fighting spirits remain in spite of the repression and because
of the repression. 188 The commitment among rights lawyers and to a
large cause and resilience in their struggling are both saddening and
encouraging. Take Xie Yang’s case for example. Xie Yang was one of
the lawyers who were arrested in the 709 crackdown and the only one
who was from outside Beijing. 189 Lawyers, such as Jiang Tianyong,
Chen Jiangang, and Lin Qilei, gathered to his rescue and showed their
support, leading to their own detention and near constant harassment
and monitoring. 190
Xie was given a lenient sentencing after a confession. 191 At the
same time, the government continued to punish, through criminal
prosecution and disciplinary proceedings, human rights lawyers who
184. Id.
185. For the concept of cause lawyer, see Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, CAUSE
LAWYERING AND THE REPRODUCTION OF PROFESSIONAL AUTHORITY: AN INTRODUCTION,
CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES 1-28
(1998). For an analysis of cause lawyering in China, see Fu & Cullen, supra note 4.
186. See, e.g., Pils, supra note 149, at 1266-67.
187. Fu & Cullen, supra note 4, at 120-23; Xie, supra note 177; The China Human Rights
Lawyers Group: Statement Upon the 2nd Anniversary of the 709 Anniversary of the 709
Incident, supra note 148.
188. See, e.g., Xie, supra note 177; The China Human Rights Lawyers Group: Statement
Upon the 2nd Anniversary of the 709 Anniversary of the 709 Incident, supra note 148; Ho,
supra note 154; Palmer, supra note 23.
189. China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, supra note 15, at 53.
190. See Case History: Xie Yang, FRONT LINE DEFENDERS,
https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/case/case-history-xie-yang [https://perma.cc/PX79ADD3] (last visited July 3, 2018).
191 . See Viola Zhou, Chinese Rights Lawyer Escapes Jail Term After Admitting
Subversion,
SOUTH
CHINA
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(Dec.
26,
2017),
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2125664/chinese-rights-lawyerescapes-jail-term-after-admitting [https://perma.cc/B4CU-2KJ2].
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remain defiant. Jiang Tianyong was sentenced to a 2 year term
imprisonment, for his visit to Xie’s family in Hunan while he was in
detention. 192 It was said that Jiang felt guilty for not being punished in
the initial 709 crackdown and the sense of guilt drove him to take
provocative action knowing the risks that may involve. 193 Another
lawyer, Yu Wensheng, who defended one of the 709 lawyers, was
detained in 2018 for disrupting the performance of public duties, and,
after entering a legality trapping door, was charged with a far more
serious offense of subverting state power. 194 Yu, a believer of the
mantra that the best offense is the best defense, issued an open letter
calling for the election of the State President from multiple candidates,
and he was detained a few hours after he publicized the open letter.195
Yu is now defended by activist lawyers, and the tragedy is the fact that
Xie Yang has now come forward to defend Yu. 196
Repression emboldens otherwise moderate lawyers to their legal
resistance. Given the hostile atmosphere that has been created, lawyers
may seem to be fighting a losing battle and some lawyers may be seen
to be acting in desperation. Yu’s open letter calling for the election of
the President immediately before the Party announced its decision to
end the two-term limit of the Presidency is courageous. 197 But at the
same time, few would have been surprised at the way the Party has
acted. 198 Lawyer Yang Jingzhu’s open insult to the entire Hangzhou
court for what Yang regarded as wanton disregard for procedures in a
murder trial may have made it impossible for the government not to

192 . See Jiang Tianyong Shandong Dianfu Guojia Zhengquan Shoushen Chengren
Bianzao Xie Yang Zao Kuxing [Jiang Tianyong Tried for Inciting Subversion of State Power
and Admitted Fabricating Xie Yang’s Torture Claims], XINHUA NEWS (Aug. 22, 2017),
http://news.ifeng.com/a/20170822/51715070_0.shtml [https://perma.cc/LF97-WRVU].
193. Interview with Jiang Tianyong, Lawyer, (Apr. 5, 2016).
194 . See Steven Lee Myers, China Rights Lawyer Detained After Posting ProDemocracy Appeal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/19/world/
asia/china-yu-wensheng-rights-lawyer.html.
195. Id.
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Chinese Lawyer Yu Wensheng Says, HKFP (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.hongkongfp.com/
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punish him. 199 But lawyers nevertheless keep on fighting using all
social legal means that are available. They have yet to be silenced. 200
V. CONCLUSION
Having crashed the activist lawyers and placed human rights
lawyers under tight political and professional control, the Party has also
initiated a round of legal reform to create a more autonomous and
effective judicial space to lure lawyers from the streets back into the
courts. Lawyers’ battleground is in the courtroom, as the Party
admonishes lawyers, 201 but returning to court is possible and
meaningful only if the court process is fair, independent and effective.
The judicial process has to be credible for lawyers and their clients to
buy into. The bargain that the Party aims to strike is clear: 1) lawyers
will consent to a diminished role in a range of politically sensitive or
significant cases, such as corruption cases and national security cases,
broadly defined, in exchange for an enhanced role in routine cases
touching on general social and economic rights; 2) lawyers will refrain
themselves from engaging in extra-legal activism in both real and
virtual worlds as they used to do in exchange for a more effective
advocacy in a more meaningful legal process.
Under this conceptualization, lawyers’ extra-legal mobilization
on streets and social media will be further restricted; but their functions
in the court process will be further enhanced. Moreover, lawyers’
contributions to decision-making in sensitive cases are likely to decline
and diminish, if not vanish, but will increase in cases of ordinary
justice. As judicial reform goes on, the adjudication process is likely to
be more court-centric and rule-bounded with judges playing a more
decisive role in the decision-making process. In that court-centric
process, lawyers’ advocacy is likely to become an indispensable and
integral part of the judicial process, eventually making legal advocacy
in courts attractive enough so that lawyers can concentrate on legal
advocacy and make courts their sole battleground.
199. See Shi Xiaofeng, Lawyer’s Protest Halts Hangzhou Nanny’s Arson Trial, CHINA
DAILY (Dec. 21, 2017), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201712/21/WS5a3b34baa31008cf16
da2a2e.html [https://perma.cc/UZX5-LZNX].
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Political Crackdown against China’s Lawyers, CHINA CHANGE (Mar. 2, 2018), https://china
change.org/2018/03/02/five-lawyers-write-to-minister-of-justice-cease-the-campaign-stylepolitical-crackdown-against-chinas-lawyers/ [https://perma.cc/E28T-MXVJ].
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But many questions remain unanswered. Will human rights
lawyers, as politicized as they have been, accept the Party’s partial
commitment to the rule of law? Would the legal reform offer too little
to develop a court-centric legal process? Will lawyers accept political
constraints as imposed by the Party? Will lawyers accept executive
determination of Falun Gong or other religious groups an evil cult as
the Party demands? Would human right lawyers accept the fact that
dissidents and defendants in sensitive cases will have officially
appointed lawyers only; and how would lawyers face the evidential
challenges in corruption cases in which lawyers are barred from the
entire investigative stage?
Would the partial legal reform, coupled with sever crackdown, be
able to halt the radicalizing process that we have observed in the past?
As discussed in the Article, in China’s social and economic transition,
there are bound to be abuses and miscarriages of justice leading to
human sufferings. Those sufferings, which had catalyzed human rights
lawyering in the past, will continue to provide a fertile ground for
social-legal activism. While China is reforming its legal system and
expanding the judicial space to create room for meaningful and
effective lawyering, the Party’s commitment to a court-centric and
rule-based dispute resolution is partial and limited, and, as such, the
legal process, while being reformed, remains superficial and continues
to lack the necessary credibility and effectiveness in solving social
problems that triggered the human rights lawyering in the first place.
While determined lawyers may continue to resort to extra-legal sociallegal activism on traditional or new forums, this option has become
increasingly risky.

